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In the political environment of contemporary Russia, 
government-controlled media dominate the discourse. 
However, the Internet still provides a platform for 
– and visibility to – alternative voices and ideas. 
Parody microblogging is a popular recent phenomenon 
of Russian-language social media. Users with satire 
accounts utilize the names of power holders, publish links 
to the news, and provide opinion and contextualization, 
as well as offering satirical commentary on corruption, 
the management of the country and media propaganda. 
This article studies the function of parody framing in 
critical microblogging in the Russian-language Twitter. 
It discusses accounts spoofing the elites as tactical 
media that disrupt the hegemonic discourse and interpret 
political reality for the Russian digital audience.
The Russian political environment of the 2010s is marked by a high level of state dominance over traditional and Internet media outlets, encom-
passing professional and amateur communication channels. This is the 
result of over a decade of government efforts to seize control over words 
and representations. The media have been “the primary weapon”1 and “the 
main power tool”2 in Vladimir Putin’s rise to power. Since the late 1990s, 
1Arkady Ostrovsky. 2015. The Invention of Russia: the Journey from Gorbachev’s Freedom 
to Putin’s War. London: Atlantic Books.
2 Mikhail Zygar. 2015. Vsia Kremlevskaia Rat’: Kratkaia Istoriia Sovremennoi Rossii. Mos-
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when Putin became prime minister, he has secured state ownership or 
supervision of the main national media outlets, including television, radio, 
newspapers and information agencies.3 Zygar4 and Pomerantsev note that 
the state-instructed media continuously portrayed Putin as a forceful, fear-
less, epic leader, and therefore embedded this image (Zygar calls it “Putin’s 
myth”) in the public consciousness.5 The President’s administration even 
launched a multi-language broadcasting outlet, RT (Russia Today), for the 
international audience, in order to propagate Putin’s myth abroad.6
The 2010s brought a new challenge to the state’s hegemony over 
media discourse. The elites had to decide how to control the discourse 
on multiple online media, including social networking platforms and 
non-professional blogs.7 The early 2010s seemed an emancipating time 
for resistant-minded Russian citizens: they were able to discuss corruption 
and mobilize for a protest against the government. In December 2011, 
around 100,000 people gathered in the central square in Moscow for a 
demonstration.8 These discussions of corruption, reports of wrongdoing 
by the state and the promotion of opposition politicians and journalists 
continued throughout the first half of 2012, with further offline protests 
spreading in large Russian cities. The state, however, responded harshly 
to rising dissent activism, prosecuted many members of peaceful demon-
strations and prohibited any unsanctioned public gathering that exceeded 
six individuals.9 The authorities confounded the work of the few remain-
ing liberal media,10 orchestrated an editor change at leading news portal 
Lenta.ru in 201411 and put economic pressure on the online channel TV 
Rain. Moreover, the elites tried to curb the digital deliberation by a series 
of Internet-directed measures. The laws obliged popular bloggers and 
microbloggers (those with more than 3,000 visits per day) to register with 
the government watchdog,12 and enforced a broad anti-extremism law that 
cow: Intellektual’naia literature.
3 Peter Pomeranstev. 2015. “‘The Kremlin’s Information War.” Journal of Democracy 26(4): 
40-50. Zygar. Vsia Kremlevskaia Rat’.
4 Zygar. Vsia Kremlevskaia Rat’. Pomerantsev. The Kremlin’s Information War.
5 Ostrovsky. The Invention of Russia.
6 Pomerantsev. The Kremlin’s Information War.
7 Ostrovky. The Invention of Russia.
8 BBC. 2011. “Russian election: Biggest protests since fall of USSR.” 10 December 2011. 
9 Aleksandr Sherstobitov. 2014. “The Potential of Social Media in Russia: From Political 
Mobilization to Civic Engagement.” EGOSE ‘14: Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on 
Electronic Governance and Open Society: Challenges in Eurasia: 162-6. http://dl.acm.org/
citation.cfm?doid=2729104.2729118.
10 Zygar. Vsia Kremlevskaia Rat’.
11 BBC. 2014. “Russia Lenta.ru editor Timchenko fired in Ukraine row.” 12 March 2014. At 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26543464, accessed 1 April 2016.
12 Anastasia Denisova. 2016, forthcoming. “Democracy, Protest and Public Sphere in Russia 
after the 2011-12 Anti-Government Protests: Digital Media at Stake.” Media Culture & So-
ciety. Nastya Chernikova. 2014. “Aifon v Karmane Vatnika [iPhone in the Vatnik Pocket].” 
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applied to any expression of discontent or criticism of the government’s 
politics.13 As a result, the same laws that refer to the media bind popular 
microbloggers. Nonetheless, they can still employ Aesopian language to 
express their criticism of the state.
In the realm of social media, several spoof accounts of popular polit-
ical actors have gained visibility. Such microblogs as the mock account of 
the Russian President, Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, the moustache of 
the President’s representative and Joseph Stalin, attract between 200,000 
and 1,600,000 readers. These microblogs are by no means the leaders of 
the Russian-language Twitter: pop culture personalities and government 
mouthpieces dominate the statistics. Television presenters Ivan Urgant and 
Pavel Volya have nearly 5 million followers each. In the political domain, 
the top accounts are those of the prime minister, Dmitry Medvedev (5 
million); the President of Russia (3 million); and the state-owned channel 
Pervyi kanal and the state-indoctrinated news programme Vesti.ru on the 
channel Rossiya (3 million each).14
Parody microblogs of the Russian-language Twitter may not be at 
the top of the statistics, but they encourage an intriguing balance in the 
online visibility of the hegemonic state and the opposition. A few years 
ago, when the prank profile of the president appeared on Twitter, it became 
more popular than the leader’s authentic account.15 The ex-president of 
Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, attracted 1,110,000 followers to his official 
Twitter feed @MedvedevRussia, while the spoof @KermlinRussia – born 
as a parody of Medvedev – drew over 1,500,000 followers. This example 
demonstrates that the digital space can empower alternative voices to 
pass their message to the audience and compete with hegemonic mouth-
pieces on equal terms. Though there has been limited research on Twitter 
accounts that spoof Russian leaders,16 these profiles present a phenomenon 
of alternative communication that deserves further study. In the Russian 
case, the microblogs that mock the elites sometimes turn into independent 
The Village, 23 April 2014. At http://www.the-village.ru/village/business/story/157495-ip-
hone-v-karmane-vatnika, accessed 10 April 2016. Nikolay Petrov, Maria Lipman and Henry 
E. Hale. 2014. “Three Dilemmas of Hybrid Regime Governance: Russia from Putin to Putin.” 
Post-Soviet Affairs, 30(1): 1-26. Sherstobitov. 2014. “The Potential of Social Media in Russia: 
From Political Mobilization to Civic Engagement.”
13 Andrey Malgin. 2014. “Vnimatelno Chitayem Zakon o Blogerakh, Prinyatyi Vchera Dumoi 
[Let Us Carefully Read the Blogger Law that Was Passed by Duma Yesterday].” Echo of 
Moscow, 23 April 2014. At http://www.echo.msk.ru/blog/avmalgin/1306048-echo, accessed 
10 July 2014.
14 SocialBakers.com. 2016. Twitter Statistics for Russia. At https://www.socialbakers.com/
statistics/twitter/profiles/russia, accessed 26 August 2016.
15 Ivan Tyutyundzhi. 2011. “Fenomen KermlinRussia v rossiyskom informatsionno-politich-
eskom prostranstve.” Sotsiologiya Vlasti, 5: 51-53.
16 Tyutyundzhi. Fenomen KermlinRussia. Julia Ioffe. “Meet the Persident.” Foreign Policy. 
3 January 2011. At http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/03/meet-the-persident, accessed 10 
August 2016.
26                             Demokratizatsiya 25:1 (Winter 2017)
opposition mouthpieces known for their “merciless mockery of Putin and 
other government officials.”17
In this research, I investigated the role of parody framing in the 
political communication of the leading oppositional spoof accounts in 
the Russian Twitter. The research question was: How do popular spoof 
microbloggers employ parody framing in political criticism and commen-
tary on the news in the Russian-language Twitter? I inquired how each 
account holder engaged (or not) with the impersonated character; what 
style of communication and humor they endorsed; whether they preferred 
commenting on the immediate news or issuing remarks on the issues of 
Russian politics in general; whether they were sharing links and retweeting 
others, or focusing on personal expression. I have performed content and 
textual analysis of 700 tweets from the four most popular critical politi-
cal spoof accounts on Russian Twitter. In this analysis, I investigated the 
assumption that Russian parody microbloggers of the 2010s act as tactical 
media outlets, provide analytical commentary and contextualization to the 
news and use the parodied persona as a one-off bait to attract an audience 
rather than a source of playful impersonation.
The article starts with an analysis of the existing studies on parody 
and satire in the digital age: it discusses the theory on connective action, 
media gatekeeping and tactical activism in relation to the spoof microblog-
gers, and evaluates the role of parody political Twitter accounts in liberal 
and non-liberal regimes. Then the methodology is explained, and the 
results are provided. The analysis of the main themes and style of humor; 
approaches to impersonation and contextualisation; and varying degrees 
of topicality and interconnectivity with other accounts makes possible new 
conclusions about the role of Russian political parody microbloggers as 
mouthpieces for political commentary and free speech online.
The Role of Parody in (Challenging) Power Relations
Classic literary studies18 regard parody as a paradoxical phenomenon. 
On the one hand, it assists the hegemony by confirming the status of the 
elites as power holders.19 On the other hand, it has revolutionary potential 
to destabilize existing power relations20 by pointing to the weaknesses 
of leaders. This ambivalence constitutes the “praise and blame” ethos of 
17 Marc Bennetts. “Satire is Thriving in Russia, While Many Russians Aren’t.” News-
week. 2 May 2016. At http://europe.newsweek.com/russia-political-satire-vladimir-pu-
tin-ntv-454525?rm=eu, accessed 8 August 2016.
18 Linda Hutcheon. 1994. Irony’s Edge: The Theory and Politics of Irony. London: Routledge: 
3-4; 28-34.  Simon Dentith. 2000. Parody. New York: Taylor and Francis. Margaret A. Rose. 
1993. Parody: Ancient, Modern and Post-modern. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
19 Tim Highfield. 2015. “News via Voldemort: Parody accounts in topical discussions on 
Twitter.” New Media & Society, March: 1-18. 
20 Hutcheon. Irony’s Edge.
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parody and satire.21 Parody resonates with the conventional cultural codes 
and stereotypes yet allows the introduction of new ideas and criticisms in 
the discourse.
Another important feature of parody for political communication is 
intertextuality. It connects people, ideas and elements of culture.22 Previous 
studies on the use of parody in subversive politics have revealed that parody 
incorporates references to local culture,23 history, popular stereotypes and 
folklore, and draws links to the immediate political context. Parody appeals 
to audiences that share critical sentiments toward the objects of parody. It 
enables resistant individuals to escape the radar of state censors,24 comment 
on topical events25 and participate in joyful or even “silly citizenship,”26 
which blurs the trivial and political. Spoof accounts in social networks 
are a postmodernist practice: they allow revealing one’s interpretation of 
events, while playing a character and adding new layers of meaning to 
the interpretation.27 In his studies on the post-socialist USSR, Yurchak28 
noticed the emergence of a specific type of satire, “stiob”. It refers to the 
humorous texts with “such a degree of overidentification with the object, 
person, or idea at which [it] was directed that it was often impossible to 
tell whether it was a form of sincere support, subtle ridicule, or a peculiar 
mixture of the two.”29 The ethos of a metacommentary connects the resis-
tant political deliberation of the late USSR to the spoof political accounts 
of Twitter in the 2010s.
Furthermore, not only intertextuality, but the convergence of commu-
nicative platforms is taken into account. Users access their social network 
profiles from various gadgets, including mobile phones. As a result, they 
may mix the identities they present, occasionally tweeting personal obser-
vations under the mask of the spoof persona. This concept of the “context 
collapse,”30 variable self-representation in different social media, links 
the research on spoof Russian Twitter accounts to identity studies. This 
spontaneous, technology-enabled phenomenon of digital commentary on 
immediate events sheds more light on the importance of casual communi-
cation for political activism.
21 Sangeet Kumar and Kirk Combe. 2015. “Political Parody and Satire as Subversive Speech 
in the Global Digital Sphere.” The International Communication Gazette, 77(3): 212.
22 Rose. Parody: Ancient, Modern and Post-Modern, 1.
23 Kumar and Combe. Political Parody and Satire as Subversive Speech.
24 Ibid.
25 Highfield. News via Voldemort.
26 John Hartley, as cited in Highfield. News via Voldemort, 2.
27 Highfield. News via Voldemort
28 Alexei Yurchak. 2006. Everything Was Forever until It Was No More. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
29 Ibid., 250.
30 Alice Marwick and danah boyd. 2010. I Tweet Honestly, I Tweet Passionately: Twitter 
Users, Context Collapse, and the Imagined Audience. New Media & Society, 13(1): 114-133. 
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Theories on connective action31 and the “cute cat theory of digital 
activism”32 explain how everyday social media communications can obtain 
ideological value. In the era of digital networks, individuals can connect 
to each other without the intermediaries of established political parties, 
movements or professional media. In collective action, users create a 
collective critical and resistant discourse by contributing to the shared 
digital sphere from personal accounts. Humorous communication, such 
as satirical blogging and sharing of entertaining viral texts (including the 
images of cats, dogs, emotions and so forth), can draw attention to serious 
issues.33 Satirical communication uses allegory and pseudonyms, does not 
place direct blame and often shapes criticism in a light-hearted form.34
Moreover, the tenet of joyful masked communication permits study-
ing spoof political accounts in the lens of the carnivalesque resistance. 
Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory on the carnival as a form of dissent35 derives 
from his studies of medieval times. Bakhtin identifies carnival as a legal 
activity that allows for the promotion of alternative discourse, multiplicity 
of styles, and an intentional polyphony (“heteroglossia”). The elites are 
aware of the carnival yet approve of it in order to let the protest public 
let off steam. The proliferation of prank political accounts in the realm of 
social networks has echoes of Bakhtin’s36 conceptualisation of the carnival 
as a “second life, organised on the basis of laughter.” In restricted environ-
ments, digital networks often function as the parallel media reality for the 
dissent public: they reimagine political leaders in a humorous, even absurd, 
way, and by doing so discuss their real actions. Prank microbloggers raise 
the visibility of alternative discourses and fill the mainstream environment 
of a commercial network with subversive points on hegemonic politics. 
However, criticism of Bakhtin’s original concept can be also addressed 
toward the digital rebirth of a carnival. As Max Gluckman37 stressed in 
his classic argument, carnival cannot be progressive and conservative at 
the same time. The elites maintain control over the time and place of the 
carnival, therefore this public manifestation of discontent tends to reaffirm 
the existing power relations. White accordingly notices that, from this 
31 W. Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg. 2012. “The Logic of Connective Action: The 
Personalization of Contentious Politics.” Information, Communication & Society, 15 (5): 
739-768.
32 Ethan Zuckerman. 2013. “Cute Cats to the Rescue? Participatory Media and Political 
Expression.” In Danielle Allen and Jennifer Light, eds, Youth, New Media and Political 
Participation. Cambridge: MIT Press.
33 Ibid.
34 Clay Shirky. 2011. “Political Power of Social Media-Technology, the Public Sphere, and 
Political Change.” Foreign Affairs, 90.
35 Mikhail Bakhtin. 1984. Rabelais and his World. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
36 Ibid., 8.
37 Max Gluckman. 1965. Custom and Conflict in Africa. Oxford: Blackwell. 
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perspective, carnival serves as a safety valve for the power holders38 – they 
allow the resistant crowds to let off steam and then return to the status quo.
When parody account holders interpret the news for their followers, 
they also step into the territory of professional media. Parody microb-
logging can be interpreted as tactical media. This concept, which merges 
media production with political activism, was born in the mid-1990s. 
David Garcia and Geert Lovink39 defined tactical media as “do-it-yourself” 
independent channels within hegemonic media platforms, or the stand-
alone alternative media produced by non-professionals. “Tactical media 
are media of crisis, criticism and opposition”40 and promote voices that 
are otherwise excluded from the discourse. Russian spoof microbloggers 
collect and share links, contribute commentary and additional data, inter-
act with other users and respond to followers. Jane Singer41 refers to this 
phenomenon as “user-generated visibility” and “secondary gatekeeping.” 
These terms explain the practices of social media users when they obtain 
the news from the available professional outlets, evaluate it and decide 
whether to share it in their personal accounts.42 In the Russian case, 
“secondary gatekeeping” often results in either “upgrading” or “down-
grading” the visibility of the news and events to the social media audience.
Therefore, leading a parody microblog is a social and political 
communicative practice. Two main features influence the popularity of 
parody tweets: references to the persona who is the object of parody, 
and topicality that links this persona to the immediate context.43 The 
role of parody microblogging with high level of topicality (responses 
and comments to the immediate news or events) differs from country to 
country, depending on the political and media environment. The existing 
research on spoof microblogging in the UK44 and Australia45 shows that 
users impersonate public personas to attract attention, but then utilize their 
accounts as entertaining outlets for sharing jokes. The tweets with good 
humor, strong topicality and no in-character allusions are most popular 
with the audience.46 However, in more restricted media environments, 
38 Allon White. 1987. “The Struggle Over Bakhtin: Fraternal Reply to Robert Young.” Cul-
tural Critique, 8: 217-241.
39David Garcia and Geert Lovink. 1997. The ABC of Tactical Media. At http://preview.sarai.
net/events/tml/tml_pdf/abc_tactical.PDF, accessed 11 August 2016.
40 Ibid., para. 3.
41 Jane Singer. 2014. “User-Generated Visibility: Secondary Gatekeeping in a Shared Media 
Space.” New Media and Society, 16(1): 55-73.
42 Ibid., 1.
43 Highfield. News via Voldemort.
44 Ibid.
45 Jason Wilson. 2011. “Playing with Politics: Political Fans and Twitter Faking in 
Post-Broadcast Democracy.” Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New 
Media Technologies, 17(4): 445-461.
46 Highfield. News via Voldemort, 14.
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where the elites suppress public criticism of their actions, parody microb-
logging obtains more political weight. In South Korea, mock political 
accounts on Twitter criticize the hegemony and expose the absurdity of 
the existing political system.47 In Russia, spoof accounts of the power 
holders have a similar ethos – they provide critical commentary that has 
been excluded from the public space.48
This research does not seek to provide a comprehensive overview 
of political parody in the Russian-language social media. Each social 
network available for the Russian audience has its particular communi-
cation characteristics and diverse demographics. Nonetheless, Twitter has 
proven to be a particularly fruitful network for political research in Russia, 
as it can sustain a “crossroads of discourses:”49 open communication with 
minimal privacy setting permits the counter-flows of opinion and ideas. 
Unlike Facebook, with its inclination toward echo chamber formation in 
the Russian context,50 Twitter can serve as the meeting point for users 
with varying political views who come from various backgrounds and 
locations. The audience of Russian-language Twitter amounts to 5 million 
people,51 many of them from among the young and middle-age citizens 
who prefer Internet to television (18-45).52 Although there is a tendency for 
the Russian Twitter to replicate and echo many motifs from the mainstream 
media, it nonetheless has a capacity to maintain long-term discourses on 
the political alternatives.53
Methodology
My research focused on the four most popular parody accounts of the 
Russian-language Twitter that criticize the government and offer alterna-
tive interpretations of the news. I have chosen these accounts by the open 
statistics of Twitter popularity (they have between 300,000 – 1,600,000 
followers) and references to the established political leaders or institu-
tions in the username and framing. The most prominent liberal parody 
47 Chang Sup Park. 2013. “Political carnivalism and an emerging public space: examination of 
a new participatory culture on Twitter.” International Journal of Electronic Governance 6.4: 
302-318.
48 Ioffe. Meet the Persident.
49 Svetlana Bodrunova, Anna Litvinenko, Dmitry Gavra and Aleksandr Yakunin. 2015. 
“Twitter-based Discourse on Migrants in Russia: The Case of 2013 Bashings in Biryulyovo.” 
International Review of Management and Marketing, 5: 97-104.
50 Svetlana Bodrunova and Anna Litvinenko. 2016. “Fragmentation of Society and Media 
Hybridisation in Today’s Russia: How Facebook Voices Collective Demands.” Zhurnal 
Issledovanii Sotsialnoi Politiki, 14(10).
51 Bodrunova, Litvinenko, Gavra and Yakunin. Twitter-based Discourse.
52 Pomerantsev. 2015. “The Kremlin’s Information War.”
53Anastasia Denisova. 2016. “Democracy, Protest and Public Sphere in Russia after the 
2011-12 Anti-Government Protests: Digital Media at Stake.” Media, Culture and Society, 
December. 
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account on Russian Twitter is @KermlinRussia (1,630,000 followers). It 
started in 2010, spoofing the account of then-President of Russia Dmitry 
Medvedev,54 but later evolved into a source of continuous criticism of the 
government and corrupt elites, with the most scorn directed at President 
Vladimir Putin and his inner circle.55 The second most popular account 
from the sample, @StalinGulag (368,000 followers) pretends to tweet on 
behalf of the late Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin; the account holder criticizes 
the decisions of elites, mocks propagandistic media and contemplates the 
passive and naïve Russian population. The third account examined is @
Fake_MIDRF (182,000 followers), which tweets on behalf of a non-hu-
man entity, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The account holder 
uses the photograph of Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov as the 
account’s profile picture. He or she provides daily commentary on the news 
and complains about the corruption of Russian power holders. The fourth 
account in the study, @Sandy_mustache (220,000 followers), imperson-
ates the mustache of Dmitry Peskov, the spokesperson of Russian President 
Vladimir Putin. The account holder utilizes the drawn image of Peskov as 
the profile picture and publishes commentary on the political and economic 
news, as well as cartoons and original aphorisms on Russian politics and 
national stereotypes.
The sample includes 2,800 recent tweets from all four accounts 
(700 each), retrieved by June 21, 2016. I did not set the starting date of 
data collection, but established the finishing date as June 21. It enabled 
me to compare an equal number of texts that parody microbloggers were 
posting simultaneously while responding to the same news and events. The 
uneven distribution of texts in time among accounts demonstrated different 
blogging patterns: for instance, @StalinGulag produced 700 tweets just 
within two months, from April 18 to June 21, while @KermlinRussia was 
much less frequent in its blogging. It took @KermlinRussia six months 
(from December 12, 2015 to June 21, 2016) to release 700 tweets. My 
data constitutes a non-representative sample, as the findings cannot be 
generalized to the whole number of parody accounts in the Russian Twitter. 
However, these microblogs are the most popular, which means that the 
findings on them create a solid basis for inductive analysis.56 Due to the 
exploratory character of my research goal – to comprehend the role of the 
parody framing in the spoof microbloggers’ political commentary – the 
inductive approach was the most viable. It enabled me to extract ideas 
from records and generate a conceptual understanding of the ongoing 
social processes.57 Within the sample of 700 tweets, the saturation of data 
54 Lenta. “Yekaterina Romanovskaya pokinula proekt “Perzident Roissi”. Lenta.ru. 4 Novem-
ber 2014. At https://lenta.ru/news/2014/11/07/kermlin/, accessed 9 August 2016.
55 Ioffe. Meet the Persident. Bennetts. Satire is Thriving in Russia.
56 Alan Bryman. 2014. Social Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
57 W. Laurence Neuman. 2014. Social Research Methods: Quantitative and Qualitative Ap-
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was reached. (Saturation refers to the point in data collection when a 
researcher realizes that she has collected enough evidence and that adding 
new participants or texts would not bring any new themes or substantial 
alterations from the existing codes.)58 Within the collected sample, each 
parody microblogger exhibited their interest in a diverse array of subjects, 
used various styles of political commentary, made uneven references to the 
source of parody and exploited humor in many ways.
The main themes were coded manually and categorized in the 
following schema: topical, political, topical and political, character-spe-
cific, self-exposure, retweets and external links. The tweets that responded 
to recent events and statements were coded as “topical”; they may or may 
not relate to the parodied persona. “Political” tweets contained criticism of 
the Russian elites; they may or may not relate to the immediate news and 
events. “Topical and political” tweets responded to the news and incorpo-
rated political criticism or contextualization. Contextualizing is the broad 
term to identify the tweets that link current events and statements with 
the wider context; they often inform the audience of the hidden agenda 
or provide additional facts and ideas to stimulate critical interpretation. 
“Character-specific” tweets are those relating to the persona/institution/
entity that the account pretends to represent: they interpret the events from 
the character’s point of view or incorporate references to certain stereo-
types or known traits of the parodied persona/institution.59 “Self-exposure” 
identifies the occasional tweets containing mentions of the account hold-
er’s authentic personality or thoughts. In these instances, the microblogger 
steps out of the parodied character and talks about personal experiences, 
relationships with other people or Twitter accounts or shares insights in 
their professional or personal life.
The collected data was further scrutinized according to the number 
of retweets or responses to other Twitter users, and the number of external 
links shared. This part of coding enabled me to analyse the interconnectiv-
ity of the chosen parody microbloggers with other Twitter accounts, media 
outlets, other social networks or Internet resources. It showed whether 
spoof account holders preferred to focus on their self-expression and 
opinion, or endorse and promote the ideas and jokes of others. By adding 
this element to the content analysis, this research aimed to distinguish the 
microbloggers with a self-centred ethos from those that function as hubs 
of information and analysis.  
In order to enrich the understanding of the style of critical commen-
tary and pattern of the microbloggers’ self-expression, I have performed 
proaches (Vol. 13). Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 177-178.
58 John W. Creswell. 2014. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods 
Approaches. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 77.
59Highfield. News via Voldermort, 6-7.
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textual analysis on a sample of tweets that were topical and political 
at the same time. I have picked a case study that attracted commentary 
from all four accounts: the viral quote of the Russian Prime Minister 
Dmitry Medvedev about pensions. In 2016, the Russian Prime Minister 
created many headlines with the announcement that there was no money 
in the budget to increase pensions.60 The politician was on an official 
visit to Crimea, walking in front of television cameras, when a pensioner 
approached and complained about the government’s failure to index 
pensions. Medvedev replied: “There is no money. But be strong. All the 
best. Have a good day, and good health.” The video of this meeting went 
viral on the Internet: 3.5 million people watched it on YouTube within two 
weeks.61 Many social media users picked on Medvedev’s words to criti-
cize the government and discuss the bold character of the power holders’ 
rhetoric. The comparative study of the topical and political tweets that 
involved references to Medvedev’s statement revealed the common trends 
and differences in the microblogging approaches of all four accounts. This 
enabled me to see how the spoof account holders present the news, provide 
context or explanation, or exploit news and events as the starting point to 
discuss other grievances and make jokes about politics.
Lastly, through content and textual analyses, I evaluated how spoof 
accounts mobilize parody framing to shape their political commentary 
and whether hoax identity plays any role in their satirical communication.
Results: Russian Parody Microbloggers as the Mouthpieces of 
Contextualisation and Criticism
Russian parody microbloggers have developed personal styles of expres-
sion and approaches to blogging. All four accounts studied were different 
in the ways they responded to the news and interacted with the audience, 
other Twitter users and external Internet sources. They utilized the framing 
of the official mouthpiece of the President of Russia, a fake Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs account, moustache of the President’s spokesperson and 
the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. Although three out of four accounts hold 
the names of existing personas and institutions, they held little or no refer-
ences to the sources of their prank in their communication. According 
to the content analysis, neither @KermlinRussia, @Fake_MIDRF or @
StalinGulag pretended to “be” the person or institution that they referred 
to in their name – they did not try to convince the audience that they were 
the account of the president, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or the Soviet 
leader. There were no allusions to the parodied individuals and institutions 
in the sample. Only @Sandy_mustache featured three references to the 
60BBC. “Russian PM: ‘No money for pensions, but have a good day!’” BBC Trending. 23 May 
2016. At http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-36482124, accessed 9 August 2016).
61BBC. “Russian PM: ‘No money for pensions”.
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pranked spokesperson of the Russian President, Dmitry Peskov. Among 
the character-specific tweets were, for instance, the hint to the corruption 
scandal that involved the spokesperson and his wife Tatiana Navka:62
“Tanya, if they ask us about the offshore [accounts], tell them that 
you do not know the person with this surname. And that the gypsies have 
stolen your passport in the suburban train” (Таня, если спросят про о
фшор, скажи, что не знаешь человека с такой фамилией. А паспорт 
украли цыгане в электричке). (@Sandy_mustache, April 4, 2016)
In another instance, the account holder pointed to the fact that, 
though Dmitry Peskov had shaved off his famous moustache, the account 
@Sandy_mustache remained popular.
“Tanya, have you seen my moustache? – Have a look on Twitter” 
(Таня, ты не видела мои усы? – Поищи в Твиттере (@Sandy_mustache, 
February 20, 2016).
The remarkably low level of character-specific microblogging among 
the parody political accounts of the Russian-language Twitter reflects the 
global trend of this genre: users often employ the parody framing as a bait 
to attract the audience63 and then publish tweets that bear no connection 
with the source of prank. The tweets that suggested self-exposure (those 
that revealed the personality and private experiences of the account holder) 
were more prominent: @KermlinRussia (2), @Fake_MIDRF (6) and @
StalinGulag (6). In most cases, these tweets promoted the creative work 
of the account holders beyond Twitter, namely the mobile apps or the 
Facebook page of the same name. The profile page of @Sandy_mustache 
on Twitter even shows an email address with the note: “For advertising 
requests.” This detail suggests that the user is trying to turn their microblog 
into a commercial resource and acknowledges its popularity among the 
public. @StalinGulag, comparably, retweeted over a hundred tweets – but 
all of them were praise of his Twitter account and sense of humor (102 out 
of 104 retweets on his page are compliments to @StalinGulag). This also 
exemplifies the importance of self-expression and reward to the creative 
input of the parody microbloggers on Twitter. They seek recognition from 
the audience and try to boost their popularity.
“[I have attracted] 3,500 followers just over a few hours! My 
62In 2015, Russian president’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov married his partner in a pres-
tigious Black Sea Resort. Anti-corruption activists pointed to the wedding photograph of 
Peskov wearing an expensive pair of watch worth £400,000. They questioned how the official 
with a declared annual salary of £93,000 could afford such an expensive timepiece, and ac-
cused him of corruption. Peskov denied the allegations and insisted that he did not pay for the 
watch – it was a gift from his wife. Source: Ronald Oliphant. “Vladimir Putin’s Spokesman in 
Luxury Watch Scandal.” The Telegraph. 3 August 2015. At http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/vladimir-putin/11780027/Vladimir-Putins-spokesman-in-luxury-watch-scandal.
html, accessed 10 August 2016.
63Wilson. 2011. “Playing with Politics: Political Fans and Twitter Faking in Post-Broadcast 
Democracy.”
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channel in Telegram is a macho bachelor’s cave where I can make jokes 
without choosing [politically correct] words telegram.me/stalin_gulag” (За 
несколько часов 3500! Канал в телеграмме- брутальная холостяцкая 
берлога, где можно говорит неподбирая слов telegram.me/stalin_gulag) 
(@StalinGulag, April 21, 2016).
 “Whoever has ears, let them hear! Sandy_mustache in the mobile 
application SoundStreamsoundstream.media/listen/971362425 Mar” 
(Имеющий уши, да услышит! УсыПескова в мобильном приложении 
SoundStreamsoundstream.media/listen/971362425 Mar) (@Sandy_
mustache, March 25, 2016).
@Fake_MIDRF and @KermlinRussia refrained from self-promo-
tion. Nevertheless, they also included tweets that suggested self-exposure. 
For instance, they defined their own blogging style or remarked on the 
issue of authorship in social networks. When other users accused him of 
plagiarism, @KermlinRussia openly apologized for the “stolen” tweets,. 
This style of tweeting indicated that the account holder did not mind 
going completely “off character,” which further proved the insignificance 
of character-specific framing for this account. @Fake_MIDRF once 
explained the account’s style to English-speaking journalists and users who 
noticed his satirical style on Twitter:
“@KevinRothrock The only healthy attitude to Russia’s policymak-
ing is via satire. Otherwise it’s way too tragic” (@Fake_MIDRF, May 24, 
2016).
“@IlvesToomas @ChristopherJM @SupportCrackdown on satir-
ical Twitter accounts violates the principle of freedom of speech!” (@
Fake_MIDRF, May 31, 2016).
The self-referential and self-promotional tweets demonstrate that 
the microbloggers are aware of their Twitter popularity. They consciously 
work on improving it (as the links to other resources suggest). The bait of 
the prank profiles enabled the parody microbloggers to attract followers, 
but it is persistent creative output that has kept their audiences growing. 
Interestingly, parody microbloggers sometimes acknowledge their status as 
hubs of communication on Twitter. For example, @StalinGulag announced 
in advance that he would hold a live commentary on the Eurovision-2016 
competition, and @KermlinRussia, @StalinGulag and @Fake_MIDRF 
were all actively commenting live on football matches during the Euro-
2016 Championship in France. Such live-tweeting was not uncommon 
during these events, but the communication of @StalinGulag, for example, 
contained appeals or instructions to the audience. This demonstrated 
how aware the user was of his popularity. He included many patronizing 
pieces of advice, such as encouraging viewers to get a drink, or go to 
bed, when there was not much hope left for the Russian team. However, 
this user rarely engaged in conversation with followers and preserved 
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a one-to-many pattern of communication. Similarly, the analysis of @
Sandy_mustache’s tweets also revealed a tendency to act as a one-to-many 
communication outlet: he retweeted other users only 62 times, and barely 
interacted with the commentators.
Two other accounts, @KermlinRussia and @Fake_MIDRF, were 
more active in holding discussions with other Twitter users. These parody 
microbloggers were also more “generous” in letting other users profit 
from their visibility – they shared 177 (@KermlinRussia) and 262 (@
Fake_MIDRF) retweets of other users and many external links. In addition 
to the retweets, they generously distributed links to external resources in 
their Twitter feeds (@KermlinRussia, 199; @Fake_MIDRF, 304). These 
included links to liberal media, opposition blogs and anti-corruption inves-
tigations, which acquainted their followers with various critical ideas and 
facts. @Sandy_mustache, by comparison, shared only 104 external links 
and preferred to focus on its own commentary to the news and events. 
Nonetheless, all three accounts (@KermlinRussia, @Fake_MIDRF and 
@Sandy_mustache) were similar in their responses to the news agenda: 
they combined information, opinion and user-generated content on a 
daily basis. They monitored the news and quickly responded, often with 
interpretation and criticism of the elites. This style of communication 
resembled the work of media outlets that amalgamated links, ideas and 
discussions. @StalinGulag was the only account in the sample that did not 
include a substantial amount of external links or retweets, and performed 
as a standalone opinion mouthpiece.
The high level of topical tweets in the sample (@Kermlin Russia, 
269; @Fake_MIDRF, 163; @StalinGulag, 243; @Sandy_mustache, 55) 
reveals that parody microbloggers follow the news and offer their commen-
tary. This commentary is likely to be political and suggest a certain point of 
view, as the majority of the topical tweets among all four users were also 
political (@KermlinRussia, 139; @Fake_MIDRF, 152; @StalinGulag, 
119; @Sandy_mustache, 42). This finding supports the assumption that 
political parody microbloggers in Russia utilize their accounts to contex-
tualize the news and explain the political background of events. They take 
references to the immediate news as their starting point in a discussion of 
the government’s wrongdoings.
Many tweets by the parody microbloggers scorned what they consid-
ered the mainstream media’s propaganda on patriotism and conspiracy 
theories. For example, these tweets by @KermlinRussia and @Fake_
MIDRF mock the popular idiom “Russia is rising from its knees” that 
symbolizes the revival of a powerful Russia. The users cast doubt on the 
wealth and might of Russia as it is in 2016, and juxtapose the propagandist 
quote with recent statistics.
“Russia has risen from its knees and ran to find some food: according 
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to Nielsen, 47% of citizens are saving on food” (Россия встала с колен 
и побежала искать еду: по данным компании Nielsen 47% граждан 
начали экономить на продуктах питания) (@KermlinRussia, 20 May 
2016).
“Russians are now earning less than the Chinese.” We were rising 
from our knees. We hit the chair with our heads. We fell flat on our faces in 
the mud” (“Россияне стали зарабатывать меньше китайцев” Вставали 
с колени. Ударились головой отабуретку. Упали в грязь ебалом 
плашмя) (@StalinGulag, 18 May 2016).
In another instance, @Sandy_mustache condemned recent legisla-
tive initiatives by the Russian parliament64 that suggested withdrawing 
citizenship for the support of terrorism, limiting the activity of religious 
groups and increased access to private communications by security agen-
cies (Eckel, 2016). The microblogger explicitly demonstrated the extent 
to which such laws can harm freedom of expression. He made a pun on 
the phrase “Next, please!” that one frequently hears at the cashier in the 
fast-food chain McDonald’s. In Russian, it sounds as “Free cashier!”, so 
the blogger made a pun on the connotations of the Russian word “free” 
(“svobodnyi”), which can both mean “available” or “unrestricted.”
“The phrase “Free cashier!” will be considered an extremist appeal” 
(Фраза “Свободная касса!” Будет признана экстремистским лозунгом) 
(@Sandy_mustache, April 25, 2016).
“Why pass the restrictive laws every day, when you can just take a 
sheet of paper and write down everything that is allowed” (Зачем каждый 
день принимать запретительные законы, когда можно на одном 
листочке написать всё что разрешено) (@Sandy_mustache, May 25, 
2016).
“Mornings make adults commit suicide. Hey, Mizulina [Yelena 
Mizulina, the Russian MP known for promoting many restrictive laws], 
prohibit the mornings, I know you want to!” (Утро толкает взрослых 
людей на совершение суицида. Эй, Мизулина, запрети утро, я же знаю 
тебе хочется!) (@StalinGulag, 18 May 2016).
The tweets cited above exhibit the common communication style 
of satirical microbloggers: they link narratives to the idioms, news and 
previous wrongdoings of political leaders. They shape their criticism in a 
form of an aphorism or a pun, and often include quotes and facts. 
The case study of Dmitry Medvedev’s quote about pensions and the 
social media response to it permitted me to compare parody microbloggers’ 
responses. When a pensioner asked Dmitry Medvedev about the indexation 
of pensions, he replied that there was no money for that in the budget and 
64Mike Eckel. “Russia’s ‘Yarovaya Law’ Imposes Harsh New Restrictions On Religious 
Groups.” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. 11 July 2016. At http://www.rferl.org/content/
russia-yarovaya-law-religious-freedom-restrictions/27852531.html, accessed 9 August 2016.
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finished the conversation by saying “But be strong. All the best. Have a 
good day, and good health” (BBC, 2016). Between them, the four parody 
microbloggers published roughly 30 tweets that contained (in full or in 
parts) the phrase “But be strong. All the best. Have a good day, and good 
health.” The majority of users utilized the quote to speculate on the corrupt 
authorities; they directed their blame either personally at Medvedev or the 
Russian elites in general.  
“Dmitry Medvedev in a tuxedo tells the Russian pensioners: “There 
is no money. But be strong. Have a good day!” (Дмитрий Медведев во 
фраке говорит российским пенсионерам: «Денег нет. Вы держитесь 
тут. Хорошего настроения!”) (@Fake_MIDRF, June 10, 2016).
“Dmitry Anatolyevich, no one can survive on a pension like this. 
– Do not worry, when the money arrives, we will do the indexation of 
our income. And you be strong!” (Дмитрий Анатольевич, на такую 
пенсию не проживёшь. — Не беспокойтесь, будут деньги, мы всё 
себе проиндексируем. А вы тут держитесь!) (@Sandy_mustache, May 
23, 2016).
“[The essence of] Russia is the prime minister with an annual income 
of 8.8 million who tells the old people with a pension of 8,000 rubles that 
there is no money, but they should be strong” (Россия—это премьер-
министр с годовым доходом 8,8 миллионов, сообщающим старикам 
с пенсией 8 т: денег нет, держитесь) (@StalinGulag, May 24, 2016).
Another important narrative that emerged out of the microblog-
gers’ mockery of Dmitry Medvedev was criticism of state media and 
popular propaganda themes. Parody accounts utilized Medvedev’s quote 
to comment on media assertions that Russia was wealthy and held a strong 
position on the global political arena. They also questioned the popular 
Russian media rhetoric that the United States of America was responsible 
for Russia’s economic and political troubles. @KermlinRussia connected 
Medvedev’s quote with a video by the government’s English-language 
channel RT (also known as Russia Today). This pro-Kremlin video 
speculates on what could have happened if Russia had not annexed the 
Crimean peninsula in 2014, and suggests a gruesome alternative scenario 
for the local population. By linking the prime minister’s announcement 
with the propaganda video, the microblogger points to the manipulation 
and lies of the government and its media. The microblogger disrupts the 
hegemonic media agenda and suggests alternative readings of its narratives 
and messages.
“There is no money, but be strong and say thanks that you have 
not kicked the bucket yet (new video from RussiaToday)” (Денег нет, 
но вы там держитесь и скажите спасибо, что ещё не сдохли (новый 
ролик от RussiaToday): www.youtube.com/watch?v=BwEC1SuhpCo) 
(@KermlinRussia, June 9, 2016).
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The third way to interpret and contextualize Medvedev’s quote was 
to turn it into a meme, a viral catchphrase that one could use on any occa-
sion. The repetition and redistribution of this meme for weeks after the 
statement reminded the audience of the government’s unashamed rhetoric.
“The annual pay of players on the Russian football team is 1.8 
billion rubles. And you be strong, have a good day http://pbs.twimg.
com/media/ClbHtpmWQAADv4u.jpg” (Годовая зарплата футболистов 
российской сборной - 1,8 млрд рублей. Вы держитесь тут, хорошего 
вам настроения. http://pbs.twimg.com/media/ClbHtpmWQAADv4u.jpg) 
(@Fake_MIDRF, June 21, 2016).
“Go to bed. There is no money and it makes no sense to be strong” 
(Идите спать. Всё равно денег нет и держаться смысла тоже нет) (@
StalinGulag, May 24, 2016).
“Money cannot buy a good mood!” (Хорошее настроение за 
деньги некупишь!) (@Sandy_mustache, May 24, 2016).
The Medvedev case study reveals that parody microbloggers utilize 
the news and statements in ways that vary from putting the events in a 
context that the propaganda media would never show to turning embar-
rassing moments for the government into viral hits. This activity resembles 
media gatekeeping, where journalists decide what to put in the spotlight 
and how to interpret it for the audience. Spoof accounts engage in “second-
ary gatekeeping” and upgrade the visibility of news that helps to criticize 
the government. Moreover, they employ their popular parody accounts as 
tactical media – they point to the issues of hegemonic politics and hold the 
authorities to account. By performing the latter, they take over the duty that 
the state-controlled media in Russia have abandoned.
Furthermore, the microbloggers highlight the absurdity and mislead-
ing nature of the government’s claims. By doing so, they not only comment 
on the news, but object to the narratives of propaganda. In this confronta-
tion, the parody accounts operate as classic satirists and innovative culture 
jammers at the same time. Following in the footsteps of the newspaper 
lampooners or cartoonists, they exaggerate certain sides of the discourse 
or traits of the main actors; they put the authorities under the magnifying 
glass. From the standpoint of culture jamming, they remix the elements of 
culture and exploit the viral nature of networked communication to spread 
their unconventional message. The parody account holders disrupt the 
hegemonic discourse and reveal the hidden meaning of what is being said 
and done. By contextualizing the quotes of the power holders and turning 
them into viral jokes, the microbloggers increase the political awareness 
of their audience. They create resistant narratives and educate followers 
through the continuous flow of critical communication.
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Conclusion
Amalgamating the findings from textual and content analysis reveals 
that Russian parody microbloggers largely refrain from references to the 
parodied personas. They do not aim to impersonate the actors and insti-
tutions that they mention in the account framing. They currently utilize 
these usernames as brand names for communicating with Twitter crowds. 
Intriguingly, this study of the Russian parody microbloggers has demon-
strated that parody is not as prominent as satire in their communication 
patterns. In order to explain this seeming inconsistency, one may consider 
the political environment of contemporary Russia. In the present limited 
media environment of Russia, holding a critical political account can be 
dangerous: both the state and pro-state groups may persecute or threaten 
the opponent of the Kremlin. For this reason, the parody framing serves as 
a protective shield rather than a source of playful impersonation. Hiding 
behind a pseudonym permits the account holders to stay anonymous and 
keep their identity from the communication watchdog or state supporters. 
Although they may need to report their passport details to the govern-
ment,65 they can at least be safe from pro-government activists.
In the present political circumstances, where the state controls the 
majority of the traditional and popular digital media in Russia, individual 
critical mouthpieces in social media are precious as the few remaining hubs 
of resistant ideas. This article has illuminated the prevailing patterns of 
criticism and communication styles, disclosed that users often immerse the 
news in an instant political commentary, link the events and their prereq-
uisites, blame corrupt officials and juxtapose their words with the facts. 
Russian parody microbloggers comment on the news on a daily basis and 
pick the anti-government stories, which they then distribute to their follow-
ers with a critical judgement. They often aim to turn their oppositional 
criticism into a viral joke. This format exemplifies the longevity of the 
critical narrative in social networks, as users exploit it on many occasions 
and circulate it even weeks after the news event. The analysis revealed that 
parody framing in Russian microblogging has a different role from parody 
framing in liberal countries. Russian politicized spoof accounts shield 
their identity and promote alternative interpretations and political ideas. 
Western parody microbloggers seek to entertain their audience, while 
the Russian politicized prankers aim not only to amuse, but educate their 
followers on politics. Moreover, the low degree of impersonation and role 
play in Russian parody microblogging makes it possible to identify these 
microbloggers as independent tactical media rather than artists with playful 
self-expression; they serve as sources of information and political ideas.
65Andrey Malgin. 2014. “Vnimatelno Chitayem Zakon o Blogerakh, Prinyatyi Vchera Dumoi 
[Let Us Carefully Read the Blogger Law that Was Passed by Duma Yesterday].”
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Further research should help to analyze feedback from followers 
and commenters; examine whether they relate to the parodied personas or 
understand the spoof; investigate how they perceive the critical communi-
cation and respond to it; and determine which tweets attract like-minded 
individuals, and which texts encourage hate speech from supporters of the 
state. Overall, the research on parody microblogging in Russian Twitter 
has much potential to reveal the main themes and allegories of the existing 
(though narrow) resistant discourse in Russian-language social media.

